基于信息非对称视角的农村信贷配给研究

Credit Rationing in Rural Financial Market:A Study Based on Information Asymmetry

根据农村地区信贷配给的现状,从信息经济学的视角出发,对农村地区银行机构对农户信贷配给进行理论解释,研究发现:事前和事后的信息不对称能够充分解释银行机构的惜贷行为和对农民信贷配给。对农户融资的可行性研究结果表明,抵押担保和互相监督机制能够消除银行和农户之间的信息不对称,并通过改变两者的博弈结果可以增进银行和贷款农户的整体利益。由此需要采取缓解农民信贷约束和推进农村金融改革的相关对策。

Based on the phenomenon of credit rationing in rural districts of China,this paper,from the perspective of information economics,presents a theoretical explanation for the credit rationing of banks in rural areas. Ex ante and ex post information asymmetries are found to well account for these banks＇ credit crunch and rationing to peasants. Feasibility study results indicate that mortgage/guarantee and peer monitoring may mitigate the information asymmetry between banks and peasants and increase the overall welfare by altering their game results. At last,we present related suggestions aiming to alleviate the credit constraint on peasants and promote rural financial reforms in China.