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债务杠杆、所有权特征与中国上市公司投资行为研究 被引量:23

On Debt Leverages,Ownership Characteristics and the Investment Behaviors of Chinese Listed Companies
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摘要 本文以我国2001~2008年上市公司的经验数据为样本,对债务杠杆、所有权特征以及公司投资决策行为之间的相互关系进行了实证研究。结果发现,就上市公司整体而言,债务杠杆表现出对公司治理的正向效用,但这种效用会伴随着所有权结构的趋于集中而发生变化。对国有产权上市公司,债务杠杆总体表现出对过度投资的抑制作用,并且这种效用随着股权集中度的提高呈现出先减弱后增加的趋势,而在所有权集中状态下,没有证据显示债务杠杆会对国有产权上市公司的投资不足产生激励;对非国有产权上市公司,债务杠杆同时表现出对过度投资的抑制作用与对投资不足的激励作用,并且对投资不足的激励会随着股权集中度的提高而逐渐减弱,没有证据表明负债的破产威胁同样会缓解公司的投资不足问题,而相对于国有产权上市公司来说,在非国有产权上市公司中债务杠杆对过度投资的抑制作用更为显著。此外,就债务的期限结构来说,不论是对过度投资的抑制作用,还是对投资不足的激励作用,相对于长期债务而言,短期债务对投资的影响更为显著。 Based on the empirical data of listed companies during 2001 -2008, we study on the relationships be- tween debt leverage, ownership characteristics and investment behaviors of the companies. It is found that, for all types of listed companies, debt leverages show positive effect on the corporate governance. That effect, however, varies with the concentration of the ownership. For the state-owned listed companies, debt leverage shows effect of alleviating the over-investment and this effect shows trends of first-weakening-then-strengthening with the concentrating of the ownership. In the case of ownership concentration, there is no evidence that debt leverages would aggravate the investment-deficiency behaviors of the state-owned listed companies. While for the non-state-owned listed companies, debt leverage shows effects of both alleviating the over-investment and aggravating the investment-deficiency. It is shown that the effect of aggravating the investment-deficiency would be weakened as the ownership concentration degree increases. There is no evidence that the liability bankruptcy threat would alleviate the investment-deficiency. Compared with state-owned listed companies, in non-state-owned listed companies the debt-leverage-induced effect of alleviating the over-investment would be stronger. In terms of the debt maturity structure, the effects of long-term liabilities are stronger than short-term liabilities on both alleviating the over-investment and aggravating the investment-deficiency.
作者 窦炜 刘星
出处 《经济与管理研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第2期33-45,共13页 Research on Economics and Management
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(70772100) 教育部博士点基金项目(教技发中心函[2006]226号) 重庆大学2010"笹川良--优秀青年奖学基金"
关键词 债务杠杆 所有权 过度投资 投资不足 Debt Leverage Ownership Characteristics Over-Investment Investment-Deficiency
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