摘要
列宁在"伯尔尼笔记"中所呈现出来的思想变化,究竟是一种皈依唯心主义的宣言,还是获得了对唯物主义与唯心主义之关系的全新理解?本文通过对杜娜叶夫斯卡娅在这一问题上的原初语境的研讨,指出列宁在1915年之后所重新建立的马克思主义革命辩证法,实际上是对黑格尔辩证法的主体自由创造运动的一种辩证改造。它不能简单地归结为列宁对唯心主义观念的接受,而应看作是列宁对马克思历史辩证法主体向度的重新激扬,它最终是要指向群众作为革命主体的历史实践的。
On Lenin's "Philosophical Notebook" and his study for Hegelian dialectics, what is the point of Lenin' s difference between 1908 and 19147 Is it an idealist return or a new understanding of materialism and idealism? After research of Dunayevskaya' s study on this issue, my point is that Lenin in fact reconstructed Marxist revolutionary dialectics which sterns from dimension of subject' s self- creation of Hegelian dialectics, and for Lenin, that is not an idealist receipt, but a rediscovery of subject within Marxian dialectics. From Lenin to our days, this is also an important legacy of mass as revolutionary subject.
出处
《南京社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第2期61-65,共5页
Nanjing Journal of Social Sciences
关键词
辩证法
自由
主体
群众
自我发展
dialectics
freedom
subject
mass
self-development