煤炭企业集团超产和政府监管博弈分析

Game on Coal Enterprise Groups over Productionand Government Supervision

政府需要通过国有股权代理人发挥对大型煤炭集团产量监管的职能,协调和执行限产政策,稳定煤炭价格,得到合作的经济利益。分别建立了不存在贿赂和存在贿赂的情况下的博弈模型。模型分析结果为在不存在贿赂的情况下,加大对国有股权代理人疏于监管的惩罚,可以有效降低超产的概率,在存在贿赂的情况下,当对国有股权代理人疏于监管的惩罚大于大型煤炭企业超产的利润时,可以杜绝贿赂超产的发生。

Governments need to supervise the output of coal enterprise groups through the agent of the state-owned shares, coordinate and implement the policies of limit production to stable coal prices and get the economic benefits of cooperation. The game models are established under the inexistcnce and existence of bribery. Model result is to increase penalties to the agent of the state-owned shares for negligent supervision can reduce the probability of over production under the inexistenee of bribery. The other result is the bribery and over production can be preventedwhen the penalties to the agent of the state-owned shares for negligent supervision are greater than than the profits of coal enterprises over production.