股份合作制下的委托代理分析

Principal Agent Analysis under Stock Cooperation System

指出股份合作制的一个重要特征是委托人内化，即企业员工互为委托人及代理人．通过一个简单的企业模型，将股份合作制的这一特征纳入委托代理理论的分析框架，研究表明，在股份合作制下，尽管股权结构对员工积极性的发挥有重要的影响，但它并不能很好地解决员工“搭便车”（ｆｒｅｅｒｉｄｅｒ）问题，而一些在一般企业里行之有效的激励措施。

This paper introduces an important characteristic of the enterprises under the stock cooperation system, i.e. the internalization of the principal, which means the employees of the enterprise are both principals and agents at the same time. This point is taken into the principal agent analysis of the enterprises with a simple model. The results show that under this system, although the allotment of shares of an enterprise has an important effect on employees' enthusiasm, it can't solve the employees' free rider problem well and some incentive measures which are effective in other enterprises are probably no longer effective in this case.