多个大股东控制下的董事会结构模型研究

The Model of Board Structure on the Condition of Several Large Shareholders Existing

国外已有的董事会结构理论模型都是针对成熟资本市场,基于股权较为分散、董事会具有较大权力或较强独立性的假设而构建,然而这些假设并不符合中国国情。考虑我国普遍存在大股东集中持股的客观现实,基于大股东"掏空"动机,区分大股东间"监督"与"合谋"两种不同关系,构建多个大股东控制情况下的董事会结构理论模型。理论分析结论表明:当公司存在多个大股东时,公司董事会的组成依赖于大股东之间利益的较量。无论大股东间是监督还是合谋关系,董事会中第一大股东可控的成员随第一大股东持股比例的增加而增加,随其他大股东持股比例的增加而减小;非第一大股东可控的董事成员随第一大股东持股比例的增加而减少,随其他大股东持股比例的增加而增加;给定大股东的持股比例,相对于监督关系,在合谋关系下,董事会中第一大股东可控的董事会成员会更多,而非第一大股东可控的董事会成员更少。

The foreign research for the model of board structure generally aimed at the mature market and dispersed ownership, on the hypotheses that board of directors has bigger authority or stronger independent character. But these hypotheses do not accord with China＇ s real conditions. So based on the ＂tunneling＂ behavior of large shareholders, a theoretical model of board structure on the condition of several large shareholders existing is constructed with considerations of the supervision and collusive relations among large shareholders. Results suggest that（ 1 ） the number of directors who are controlled by the largest shareholder increases as the largest shareholding ratio increases, but decreases as other shareholding ratio increases, whether there are supervision relations or collusive relations among large shareholders; （2） the number of directors who are not controlled by the largest shareholder decreases with increasing of the largest shareholding ratio, and increases with increasing of other shareholding ratio; （3） given the large shareholding ratio, there are more directors who are controlled by the largest shareholder, and fewer directors who are not controlled by the largest shareholder, under the collusive relations than the supervision relations.