摘要
This paper examines the contribution of exports to growth in China since the early years of the decade. It is estimated that, despite a high import content ranging between 40 and 50 percent, approximately one-third of Chinese growth before the global crisis was a result of exports, due to their phenomenal growth of some 25 percent per annum. This figure increases to 50percent if spillovers to consumption and investment are allowed for. The main reason for excessive dependence on foreign markets is underconsumption. This is due not so much to a high share of household savings in GDP as to a low share of household income and a high share of profits. It is argued that China can no longer maintain such high growth rates for its exports, and, therefore, needs to turn to consumption-led growth by expanding the share of wages and household income in GDP and accelerating public spending in social infrastructure.
This paper examines the contribution of exports to growth in China since the early years of the decade. It is estimated that, despite a high import content ranging between 40 and 50 percent, approximately one-third of Chinese growth before the global crisis was a result of exports, due to their phenomenal growth of some 25 percent per annum. This figure increases to 50percent if spillovers to consumption and investment are allowed for. The main reason for excessive dependence on foreign markets is underconsumption. This is due not so much to a high share of household savings in GDP as to a low share of household income and a high share of profits. It is argued that China can no longer maintain such high growth rates for its exports, and, therefore, needs to turn to consumption-led growth by expanding the share of wages and household income in GDP and accelerating public spending in social infrastructure.
