摘要
"物质"概念的历史内涵是广延。在西方哲学史上,"物质"本体论并不占据主导地位。马克思主义哲学继承了费尔巴哈的唯物主义,并对这一概念进行了改造。分析马克思主义哲学的物质定义及其对唯心主义的批判可以发现:马克思主义哲学的"物质"实质上就是认识论意义上的"对象",这一"对象"并没有摆脱"广延"的特征,因此,"物质"概念不能构成对传统西方哲学一系列核心概念的消解。如果"物质"概念仅仅被界定为非广延的客观实在,那么,马克思主义哲学关于世界的唯物主义的结论以及对唯心主义的批判都将难以自圆其说。
The historical connotation of the concept of matter is extension and the material ontology is not the mainstream of western philosophy.Although Marxist philosophy which inherited Feuerbach's materialism reformed the concept of matter,an analysis on the definition of the concept of matter and the criticism to the philosophy of idealism made by Marxism indicates that the matter of Marxism is essentially the concept of object in the sense of epistemology and the object has still the feature of extension,so the matter can not be thought as substance.Moreover,if the matter is only understood as the objective reality which is non-extension,the materialistic conclusion about the world and the criticism to the idealism made by Marxist philosophy are questionable.
出处
《西南大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第1期74-79,191,共6页
Journal of Southwest University(Social Sciences Edition)