基于制造商和零售商自有品牌竞争的供应链广告决策

Supply Chain Advertising Decision Based on Competition of National and Store Brands

考虑一个零售商同时出售制造商品牌产品和零售商自有品牌产品的营销渠道,这两类产品之间存在一定竞争性。制造商与零售商分别进行广告投资促销并累计商誉,且制造商与零售商共同分担零售商的广告投资成本。假设零售商广告促销活动对制造商品牌商誉存在负面影响。运用微分对策的方法求解动态环境下Stackel-berg主从博弈下的最优决策,并分析了零售商和制造商处参数对决策的影响。最后证明,Stackelberg主从博弈决策优于Nash非合作博弈决策。

A marketing channel,where a retailer sells,its own store brand,along the manufacturer＇s brand,is considered.Competition exists between them.Each player invests in advertising in order to build the brand＇s goodwill,and the manufacturer bears part of the retailer＇s advertising investment.We assume that the retailer＇s advertising promotion has a negative impact on the goodwill of manufacturer＇s brand.A methodology of differential games is adopted to investigate the optimal advertising strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer in Stackelberg leader-follower game under a dynamic circumstance.The effect of the parameters of the manufacturer and the retailer on the optimal decision is analyzed.Finally,we prove that the decision of Stackelberg leader-follower game is prior to the one of Nash non-cooperative game.