摘要
美国次贷危机再次暴露信用评级机构的法律监管困境,即现行信用评级机构"发行人付费"收入模式存在根深蒂固的利益冲突问题。信用评级机构以"声誉"机制辩解,但存在重大理论缺陷和失败的经验事实证据。现行评级机构法律监管体制没能从根本上解决收入模式利益冲突的矛盾。信用评级机构未来的改革出路亟需解决利益冲突之困,可能的方案包括设立公共评级机构、恢复"订购人付费"模式、评级机构承担法律责任、政府付费购买评级服务等。
The sub-prime crisis exposed the predicament of credit rating agencies in legal regulation. Current " issuer-pay" income pattern incurs incorrigible conflict of interest. Credit rating agencies defend in the name of repu- tation, but their theory is seriously flawed and no empirical evidence can support their argumentation. Current legal regulation of credit rating agencies cannot solve the conflict of interest. In the future, the reform of credit rating agen- cies should focus on solving this predicament. We may set up public credit rating agencies and restore the pattern of "subscriber-pay". Credit rating agencies should bear legal liability. Government should pay for rating services.
出处
《上海金融》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第2期23-28,共6页
Shanghai Finance
关键词
金融危机
信用评级
收入模式
利益冲突
声誉辩解
Financial Crisis
Credit Rating
Income Pattern
Conflict of Interest
Defend in the Name of Reputation