产权性质、股权再融资与资源配置效率

Property Rights,Seasonal Equity Offering and the Efficiency of Resource Allocation

本文以1998年～2004年符合配股条件的A股上市公司为研究对象发现,民营企业发布配股预案的比率更低,实施配股的比率也更低。但这并非民营企业的外部融资需求更低,而是证券监管部门在配股审批中优先照顾国有企业。进一步的研究还表明,被批准实施配股的民营企业未来投资增长更快,而实施配股的国有企业更有可能变更募集资金的预计使用用途。这意味着监管部门在配股审批中对国有企业的照顾损害了民营企业股东的利益,影响了资源配置效率。

Using the data from 1998-2004 of listed companies who are satisfied with requirements of seasonal equity offering （hereafter SEO）, the paper finds that non-state-owned enterprises （hereafter non-SOEs） are less likely to issue a SEO plan and have a low probability to issue equity. This is not due to the low external financing demand of non-SOEs but the priority given to state-owned enterprises （ hereafter SOEs） instead. Further investigation shows that non-SOEs, whose SEO applications are approved, have a high growth rate of investment. The paper also finds that SOEs are more hkely to abuse the money raised from SEO. These findings indicate that the priority given to SOEs in SEO regulation impairs the interests of shareholders of non-SOEs and the efficiency of resource allocation.