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有限理性条件下项目团队合作中多代理人行为演化 被引量:12

Research on Multi-Agent Evolutionary Behavior with Bounded Rationality in Project Team Cooperation
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摘要 项目团队成员的行为策略选择将会直接影响到团队合作效率,甚至影响项目的成败。运用行为经济学的相关理论,以有限理性为假设前提,建立了基于异质群体的动态演化博弈模型,对项目团队合作中多代理人的行为进行了研究,分析了委托人的监督策略、利润分享系数,以及代理人的贡献度、团队合作度,其他代理人的行为对代理人行为选择策略的影响,为降低项目团队合作中的道德风险和提高团队整体绩效提供了策略建议。通过案例研究对得出的结论进行了检验,结果表明,该结论在实际项目中对提高项目整体绩效水平有很好的指导作用。 The behavior strategies that project team members chose will directly have a great impact on the cooperation efficiency of project team,and will further influence the success of project.By using the relative theory of behavioral economics,this paper built an evolutionary game model based on heterogeneous group under the assumption of bounded rationality in order to analyze the influences of principal's supervision strategy,profit sharing coefficient,agent's contribution,team cooperation degree,and the behavior choices of the other agents on the behavior choices of an given agent.The results of this paper have provided theoretical supports and strategic suggestions on how to reduce the moral hazards with respect to the cooperation of project team,as well as how to improve the team performance.Finally,a case study was carried out so as to test previous theoretical results,and it found that the theoretical results played a conducting role in improving the overall project performance in actual projects.
出处 《系统管理学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第1期119-128,共10页 Journal of Systems & Management
基金 铁道部科技开发研究计划重大课题资助项目(2008Z019-A) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70902037 70971017)
关键词 团队合作 有限理性 多代理人 行为演化 team cooperation bounded rationality multi-agent behavior evolutionary
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