电子政务外包监督机制的进化博弈研究

Evolutionary Game Research on Supervision Mechanism of E-government Outsourcing

运用进化博弈论,建立电子政务外包中政府监督供应商的博弈模型。研究结果表明:政府是否选择监督供应商,与监督成本、政府失职时的处罚力度、供应商违规的罚金等有密切关系;而供应商是否选择守规,与供应商违规获得的额外收入、供应商守规的生产成本、奖金及无形收益、供应商违规的生产成本、罚金及无形损失、供应商违规行为被发现的概率等有密切关系。通过改变这些参数大小,可以最终影响博弈双方的策略选择。

Through the use of evolutionary game theory, sets up e-government outsourcing game model that government supervises suppliers. The results show that： whether government will choose to supervise suppliers or not is closely related to supervising cost, punishing strength when government neglects duty, fines when suppliers get out of line and so on ; and whether suppliers will choose to compliance or not is closely related to extra income when suppliers get out of line, cost of production, bonus and intangible benefit when suppliers compliance with rules, cost of production, fines and intangible loss when suppliers get out of line, probability of behaviors that suppliers get out of line are found and so on. By changing the size of these parameters, can ultimately affect the choice of strategies for game bilateral.