非正式的第三方产品责任治理机制研究

A Study on the Informal Third-party Product Liability Governance Mechanisms

本文研究了非正式的第三方产品责任治理机制(私人仲裁者)作为一种事后规则对生产者与消费者间因信息不对称而导致的产品责任风险的激励作用;并通过构建私人仲裁者外生和私人仲裁者内生的产品责任模型来阐述特定条件下,其能在参与人的注意投入、市场均衡产量和产品缺陷标准等方面提供有效激励,而无需借助于正式第三方产品责任治理机制(包括产品责任法和产品责任规则)的约束。

On the basis of the product liability models with exogenous private arbitrators and with endogenous private arbitrators,this paper discusses the functions of informal third-party product liability governance mechanisms,as an incentive system of care of participants,market equilibrium quantities,and standards of product defect and so on. This paper concludes that without formal third-party product liability governance mechanisms(including product liability law and product liability regulations), as ex-post rules of correcting the information asymmetry between producers and consumers,informal Third-party product liability governance mechanisms can effectively reduce the risks of product liability or perform more effectively than formal mechanisms .