摘要
在制造商雇用销售商来销售产品的市场背景下,文章着重分析了制造商采取三种不同的销售激励合同时,销售商努力行为的变化情况。三种激励合同中,一种是线性合同——固定提成合同,另外两种是分段线性合同——提成递增或递减合同和保底封顶合同。通过模型的分析发现,不同的激励合同形式下,销售商的努力行为会受到合同中参数的影响,制造商可以根据不同市场运作目标——比如为了推广新产品、为了扩大产品市场份额等进行合同形式的选择。
This paper examines the scenario in which a manufacturer sells a single product through a sales-agent.The proposed model analyzes the agent's actions when the manufacturer adopts three kinds of incentive contracts.One of the three incentive contracts is linear contracts——fixed commission contract and the other two are piece-wise linear contracts——increased commission or decreased commission contract,floor and ceiling contract.The results show that the agent's efforts change with the parameters in the three contracts.The manufacturer can choose the form of the contracts according to the different goals such as spreading a new product,or realizing a certain sales target.
出处
《重庆大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第1期62-66,共5页
Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71002069)
中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(CDJSK100069
CDJSK100200)
重庆市科委自然科学基金计划资助项目(CSTC2010BB0041)
关键词
激励合同
线性合同
分段线性合同
incentive contracts
linear contracts
piece-wise linear contracts