摘要
运用进化博弈论理论,对生态产业链中上下游企业间的稳定性进行了分析,在分析过程中,认为有两点因素将会对生态产业链的稳定性产生重要影响:①政府可充分发挥其导向作用,制定博弈企业间合作交往的"规则"和"制度"形式,既作为一种激励机制,导向企业的行为,同时也是一种惩罚机制改变企业的收益,约束着企业的策略选择;②在企业间的长期博弈中,十分注重"声誉效应"的影响,"声誉效应"将会是企业间博弈的一种自动惩罚机制,限制着企业背离合作的选择。
This paper makes an analyses concerning the stability between upstream and downstream enterprises in the ecological industry chain with evolutionary game theory,which could be influenced mainly by two important factors:(I) the government can take good advantage of its orientation role,and regulate the form of the"rules"and "systems "in the enterprise cooperation which could act as an incentive mechanism to guide the enterprise action,as well as a punishment mechanism to change the enterprise' profit,and restrict the strategy selection of enterprises;(II)In the long term,the game participant enterprises put much emphasis on the reputation effect,which will become an auto-punishment mechanism among the enterprises,limiting the selection of enterprise noncooperation.
出处
《科技和产业》
2011年第2期47-50,共4页
Science Technology and Industry
基金
四川省国土资源局2010年重点项目
关键词
生态产业链
稳定性
进化博弈
ESS
the ecological industry chain
stability
the evolutionary game
ESS