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知识型员工晋升与培训的博弈分析 被引量:3

A Game Analysis of Promotion and Training of Knowledge Workers
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摘要 本文通过分析企业在薪酬设计与员工在人力资本获取过程中广泛存在的双向道德风险问题,构建了一个模型分析企业与员工在其中的博弈过程,认为晋升作为一种激励机制,不仅可以激励员工努力工作,而且可以督促员工发挥主观能动性,提高自身的人力资本;培训作为一种晋升的承诺,可以有效避免企业的道德风险,从而达到企业与员工双向激励的目的。 This paper construct a game model by analyzing enterprise employees in labor capital acquisition and salary design in enterprises.The paper holds that promotion as an incentive mechanism can not only motivate employees,but also urge them to take the initiative in work,and that training can effectively avoids the moral hazard to achieve dual incentive purpose of the enterprise and its employees.
出处 《西安电子科技大学学报(社会科学版)》 2011年第1期45-49,共5页 Journal of Xidian University:Social Science Edition
关键词 晋升 激励 培训 博弈分析 Promotion Incentive Training Game Analysis.
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参考文献4

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