摘要
针对我国高级技工短缺问题,从雇主视角出发,构建"委托—代理"模型对专业技能培养的投资行为进行数理推导,并在此基础上对雇佣双方的行动策略作单次动态博弈与重复动态博弈分析。结果表明由于存在技工离职的风险,企业会选择放弃对高级技工培养进行投资。为此,建议企业实施有利于雇佣双方在技能培养中采取合作行为的管理措施,为培养高级技工创造良好的博弈环境。
Targeting the shortage of senior skilled workers,this paper establishes the ‘principal-agent’ model to analyze the investment of specialized skills training with mathematical deduction from employers' perspective,and then it uses the single game model and repeated game model to analyze the actions between employers and employees respectively.The results show that because of the risk of the employees' resignation,employers tend to give up the investment of specialized skills training.Therefore,the paper suggests enterprises take some measures helping employers and employees to cooperate in specialized skills training.
出处
《当代经济管理》
2011年第2期71-74,共4页
Contemporary Economic Management
关键词
高级技工短缺
雇主视角
动态博弈分析
shortage of senior skilled workers
perspective of employers
dynamic game analysis