摘要
政府采购具有提高财政支出效益、调节经济供需总量以及保护民族产业等政策功能,其实现的载体是政府集中采购机构,而集中采购机构的运行绩效直接关系到政府采购政策目标能否实现。使用CSM模型分析政府集中采购绩效激励因素,选择集中采购机构采购效率作为内源潜变量,选择集中采购机构采购规模和采购透明度作为外源潜变量,经实证分析得出结论:集中采购机构采购透明度对政府集中采购绩效激励因素的解释率最高,集中采购机构规模次之,而集中采购机构采购效率的解释率较低。据此提出,应在财政部门与采购人之外设立独立的政府采购监督机构,作为政府集中采购绩效的激励主体。
Government procurement has the policy functions of improving the efficiency of fiscal expenditure, regulating the aggregate of economic supply and demand, and protecting national industry, whose realizing carrier is centralized government procurement organization. Whether the policy goals of government procurement can be realized is directly influenced by the executing performance of centralized procurement organization. The stimulating factors of performance of centralized government procurement are analyzed by CSM model, the procurement efficiency of centralized procurement organization is selected as endogenous latent variable, and the procurement scale and the openness degree of centralized procurement organization are selected as exogenous latent variables. Conclusions are drawn through empirical analysis: the openness degree of centralized procurement organization has the highest explaining rate to the stimulating factors of performance of government centralized procurement, the procurement scale is in the next place, and the procurement efficiency has the lowest explaining rate. It is proposed accordingly that independent supervisory organization of government procurement should be established beside the fiscal department and the procurement agent, which should be considered as the stimulating subject of the performance of government centralized procurement.
出处
《沈阳工业大学学报(社会科学版)》
2011年第1期51-55,共5页
Journal of Shenyang University of Technology(Social Sciences)
关键词
政府采购
集中采购
绩效激励
委托代理
潜变量
采购效率
采购规模
采购透
明度
government procurement
centralized procurement
performance stimulation
commission agency
latent variable
procurement efficiency
procurement scale
procurement openness