摘要
指出服务供应链中服务集成商须向服务提供商购买专用服务能力Δ,其服务量呈正态分布D=D0N(μ,σ2),且在0<D≤△,△<D≤△+αmL,△+αmL<D≤△+L三个区间各有不同的善意惩罚系数a,b,c,为获得最好的期望利润E(sg),决策的最优专用服务能力Δ*需满足纳什平衡条件。针对服务供应链中常见的集成商与提供商身份可以互换,相互取消善意惩罚契约的情况,其最佳购买的专用能力Δ*=(1+1/σ)μ-αmL。
The paper points out that the service integrator of a service supply chain should purehase dedicated service capacity from service providers and that its service volume should be in normal distribution and different good faith penalty coefficients should be determined for different volumes of service. To expect optimal profit, the paper argues, the integrator should decide on the level of dedicated service capacity to be purchased so that Nash equilibrium is established. In view of the faet that service integrators and providers of service supply chains can usually switch position given different situations, the paper proposes to excise provisions of good faith penalty from service purchasing contracts and calculates the optimal level of dedicated service capacity to be purchased.
出处
《物流技术》
2011年第2期117-118,133,共3页
Logistics Technology
关键词
服务供应链
专用服务能力
纳什平衡条件
service supply chain
dedicated service capacity
condition for Nash equilibrium