无与在:论海德格尔存在论的非同一性

Nothing and Being:On Non-Identity of Heidegger's Ontology

海德格尔"无"的思想对于其基础存在论的建构具有重要的意义。无并非直接是对某存在者的否定,而是对存在者整体的否定;但同时作为这一否定的无,其自身却不是一个存在者,它并不作为否定者而自为地出现,也不出现在存在者之旁。这一所有现存语言都无法言其是的无是任何传统形而上学的存在论都无法通达的,因为将一切都作为存在者固定下来正是传统形而上学的一贯原则。因此,无的否定意义便在这样的向度上被提示出来:否定在者自身的同一性,在者既是其所是,同时也不是其所是。无也由此彰显出海德格尔存在论的非同一性。

Heidegger＇s concept of Nothing is very important to the construction of his ontology.Nothing is not the denial to some beings,but to the whole beings;and as the denial,it is not a being in itself,or beside the beings.Nothing that all languages cannot explain cannot be touched by all ontologies of the traditional metaphysics,because the immobility of all beings is the principle of the traditional metaphysics.So the meaning of Nothing is revealed in the dimension： Nothing is the denial to the identity of beings,and as a result Nothing spreads out an area of non-identity of Heidegger＇s ontology for us.