最终控制人、政府背景与企业投资

Ultimate Controlling Shareholder,Political Connection and the Firms' Investment

从最终控制人的角度出发,研究企业高管的政府背景是否会影响企业投资决策的结果表明,政府背景显著影响了企业的投资决策;地方政府背景在中央国企中显著影响到了企业投资,中央政府背景对地方国企的投资也有显著影响,因而企业高管的政治背景与企业的最终控制人之间存在互补性;但中央政府背景在地方国企中的投资可能是无效率的。同时,民营企业可能更有效率地利用了企业高管的政府背景,一方面这种政府背景引致了更多的投资;另一方面这种投资在边际上有效率。

Based on the ultimate controller, this paper studies whether the governmental background or political connection of top managers affect the investment. We find that the bac governmental background significantly affects firms＇ investment; the local governmental kground has a significant influence on investment of the central state-owned enterprise and the central governmental background affects local investment strategies significantly, which indicates that there is a complementary relationship between the senior managers with governmental background and the ultimate controllers. The central governmental background might be inefficient in the investment of local state -owned firms while private enterprises might make full use of the governmental background of senior managers as this background brings more investments on one hand, and these investments are efficient marginally on the other hand.