我国农业保险市场失衡分析——基于效用理论视角

Analysis of China's Agricultural Insurance Market Imbalance——Based on Utility Theory

本文在分析农业保险发展现状的基础上,基于马斯洛需求层次理论、风险偏好理论及风险规避程度度量理论,建立农户风险态度呈动态变化的效用函数曲线,推导出政府对农业保险补贴的上限和下限,得出结论:政府补贴过低无法达到刺激农户购买欲望转化为有效需求;但政府对农业保险的补贴并不是越多越好,超过一定限度,反而引发更为严重的道德风险,并导致农户的风险规避程度下降,进而影响农业保险的需求。

This paper analyzes the development of agricultural insurance,based on Maslow＇s hierarchy of needs,risk preference theory and measure of risk aversion theory,established a utility function curve which changed with the attitude of farmers risk attitude,concluded：if government subsidies are too low,it cannot stimulate the farmers to make buy desire into effective demand;but if the government subsidies of agricultural insurance is too high,over a certain limit,it may lead to more serious moral hazard and lead to a decline in household risk aversion,thereby affecting the demand for agricultural insurance.