摘要
农民合作经济组织是增强农业农村发展活力的重要载体。针对现实中农民合作经济组织农民合作不尽人意的现状,运用演化博弈模型,复制动态方程的模拟,阐释农民合作者比例与合作收益、合作成本之间的关系,揭示在没有任何激励与惩罚机制的前提下,有限理性农民经过模仿与学习过程,合作行为的演化趋势将是淘汰利他的合作策略,选择不合作的搭便车策略,并达到演化稳定状态。因此,有效的制度安排对发挥农民合作经济组织制度的优越性与稳定性具有重要意义。
The farmer cooperative is a crucial carrier to increase the vitality of agriculture and rural development. Against the farmer cooperative' s unsatisfactory cooperative situation, this paper using the evolutionary game model and the dynamic equation of ESS, explains the relationship among farmer cooperative proportion, cooperative profit and cooperative cost, demonstrates that under the premise of no incentives and penalty mechanism, the bounded rationality farmers' cooperative behavior through imitation and learning process will be out of altruistic cooperation strategy , choose the non - cooperative behavior, free - rider strategy, achieve evolutionary stability. Therefore, an effective institutional arrangement is very important to display the farmer cooperative' s superiority and stability.
出处
《农机化研究》
北大核心
2011年第4期5-8,共4页
Journal of Agricultural Mechanization Research
基金
重庆市人文社科重点研究基地项目(09SKB02)