摘要
对创新型人才来说工资激励是最直接有效的激励方式。创新型人才的工资由创新产品的价值决定,因而工资中包含一个基于创新产品价值的反应度。反应度对创新型人才的激励有两个方向的作用:一方面,创新型人才会随着反应度的值增大而更努力工作;另一方面,在委托代理关系中由于存在观测误差,反应度值越大,创新型人才会因为风险加大而适度降低努力水准。工资决定中最佳的反应度值由这两方面的作用综合决定。
Salary incentive for creative talents is the most direct and efficient way.The sallaries of the innovative talents are often decided by the value of innovative products.So their salaries contain a reaction of value to products.At present,the domestic scholars focus little on the incentive process of this reaction to the innovative talents.Through the principal-agent theory,this paper draws the following conclusion: The incentive effect of the reaction to the innovative talent has two directions.On the one hand,the innovative talents will work harder when it increases;On the other hand,because of the principal-agent relationship existing observation error,to avoid risks,the bigger the reaction and the lower the their efforts.The best reaction in their salaries is decided by both factors.
出处
《重庆理工大学学报(社会科学)》
CAS
2011年第2期41-44,共4页
Journal of Chongqing University of Technology(Social Science)
关键词
创新型人才
产品价值反应度
工资
激励
innovative talents
reaction of product value
salary
incentive