强制还是自愿?——基于银团贷款视角的存款保险体系

Compulsory or Voluntary:The Deposit Insurance Scheme Based on Syndicated Loans

强制或者自愿是现行存款保险制度的两大类型,从发展趋势看,强制性存款保险制度安排在世界范围内更具有广泛性。结合Gropp和Vesala的研究框架与银团贷款迅速发展的现实背景,本文通过建立一个静态博弈模型,分别考察了当两家银行为同一借款人提供银团贷款时,银行、存款人和存款保险机构等市场主体在两种制度安排下的行为。研究发现:在两种制度安排下,银行均可以同时确立最优的监督水平。但是,在自愿性存款保险制度下,银行难以在监督水平上协调一致;而与之相反,在强制性存款保险制度下,银行可以通过合作在监督水平上达成一致。因此,中国有必要建立起强制性而非自愿性存款保险制度,以利于银行更好地开展合作和拓宽业务范围。

Compulsory and voluntary arrangements are two main kinds of deposit insurance scheme,and the compulsory one is more general in the world.In this paper,by applying Gropp and Vesala＇s framework（2004） to a static model in the context of rapid development of syndicated loans,we study the behaviors of banks,depositors and deposit insurance corporation separately.There are some findings：（1） Banks providing syndicated loans for the borrower could establish optimal supervision simultaneously under either of the two arrangements.（2） It is hard to be in harmony with each other on the level of supervision under the voluntary one,while it＇s able to reach the two goals simultaneously under the compulsory kind.So China should establish a compulsory,not voluntary deposit insurance scheme to encourage more cooperation and services.