政府竞争、资本配置与上市公司“壳资源”转让

Government Competition,Resource Allocation and "Shell Resource" Transfer

地方政府间的晋升锦标赛迫使政府官员寻求一切可能的方式完成政绩、争夺和保护地区的优势资源,人为地干预资本资源配置。以2000年至2006年地方上市国有企业被民营企业并购、控制权发生转移的公司作为样本,以是否为辖区内并购作为因变量,以行业调整的绩效指标和企业规模作为自变量,建立Logit回归模型,探讨稀缺的"壳资源"在辖区内外转让是否因其质量的不同而具有差异性。在控制公司特征、治理因素和年份固定效应等因素后,发现在卖方主导的国有上市公司"壳资源"转让过程中,地方政府倾向于将绩效好、影响力大的国有企业转让给本地民营企业,而将绩效差、影响力小的国有企业转让给外地民营企业。根据地区竞争力水平对样本进行分组,发现竞争力排名靠后的地区比排名靠前的地区"壳资源"的质量在辖区内外转让的差异更为明显,表明在经济基础较为薄弱的辖区,地方政府更倾向于采取地方保护主义的方式维持地方经济。

Competition for the promotion between the local governments drives the government officials to seek all possible means to realize the political achievements and fight for the local advantage resources.Based on samples research of private companies buying the shell of the local listed state-owned enterprises and gaining the control right during 2000-2006,this paper compares the acquired companies′ three-year ahead average financial performance and company size between the ones sold to local private companies and the ones to nonlocal in order to test whether the local governments will interfere with the listed companies′ shell resources transfer.In the logit model,the dependent variable is a dummy variable,indicating whether the shell is sold to local private companies or not.The independent variables are financial performance and company size proxies.After controlling for the firm characteristic,governance factor and year fixed effect,we find that the local stated owned enterprises which performance better and own larger size will be inclined to be sold to the local private companies while the ones with worse performance and small size will be inclined to be sold to the nonlocal private companies.Furthermore,the sample is divided into two subsamples according to the districts with high/low competitive strength to see whether the intervention degree will be different.The results show that,the districts with less competitive strength will get more intervention from the local governments during the sell resource transfer.