工程服务外包中的激励机制和定价策略研究

Incentive mechanism and pricing strategy in engineering service outsourcing

工程服务外包是制造企业应对竞争、专注核心业务、降低成本的重要途径之一.在服务外包及由此形成的服务供应链的运作中,由于供应商直接向最终客户提供服务以及服务结果难以被衡量等原因,存在着道德风险问题,需要制造商向供应商提供激励.文章研究了工程服务外包中的最优激励机制问题,运用连续工作表现的道德风险模型构建了激励模型,得出最优的激励转移支付,并详细分析了供应商努力的必要性条件和参与性要求、不同激励程度的机制设计以及不同谈判力要求下的激励机制控制等问题,在此基础上提出了工程服务外包的定价模式.认为:1)只有符合特定需求分布条件的服务才需要激励使激励有效;2)最优激励转移支付存在一个震荡间断点;3)可以通过改变参数来调整激励的程度以及成员间的利润分配比例.

Engineering service outsourcing is an important way for manufacturer to face competition,concentrate on core business and reduce cost.In engineering service outsourcing,there is moral hazard problem because and it is hard the service is offered by supplier to customer directly for the manufacturer to measure the service outcome.Therefore,the manufacturer should build up an incentive mechanism to stimulate the supplier to offer high quality service.This paper studies the optimal incentive mechanism for engineering service outsourcing.By setting up the incentive model based on the model of moral hazard under continuous working performance,the research mainly discusses the following questions： What is the prior condition for the supplier to offer costly effort？ What＇s the optimal incentive mechanism？ How does the mechanism vary according to the different degrees of incentive？ What is optimal pricing strategy for engineering service outsourcing？ etc.The results show that： 1）The incentive mechanism is necessary and available just in the service supply chains which comply with certain demand distributions.2）There is a discontinuous point on the incentive payment curve.3）The degree of incentive and ratio of profit allocation can be modified through changing the value of the parameters.