心灵哲学中的意识与意向性

Consciousness and Intentionality in the Philosophy of Mind

意识与意向性是心理现象的两个显著特征,它们之间有着密切联系,但它们常常被分开对待。近来这种状态发生了改变,分离主义越来越受质疑,并发展出了两种针锋相对的理论进路。意向性基本论认为,意识与意向性之间只存在单向的依赖关系,意向性是基本的,现象意识完全可以用意向性来说明。意识基本论则认为,意识是基本的,对意向性的理解必须以意识为基础。这两种进路都是有问题的。低等动物的表征系统以及无意识意向状态的存在表明,意向性是基本的,意识对它来说并非是必要的。但另一方面,意识又不能被还原到意向性,因为存在一种类型的意向性,它的内容恰恰是由现象意识决定的。总之,意识与意向性的关系是复杂的,意向性虽然比意识更为基本,但它们之间并不具有派生关系。

Consciousness and intentionality are the two remarkable characteristics of the mental. Although they seemed intimately connected, actually they are often treated separately. Recently, this trend has begun to change. Separatism is suffering more and more doubts. Consequently, two opposite approaches have been developed. One is intentionality primitivism, which claims that intentionality is primitive and phenomenal consciousness can wholly explained by intentionality. The other approach is consciousness primitivism, according to which intentionality is grounded on consciousness and can be truly understood only this way. The author argues that these two approaches are all problematic. The facts there are representational systems in low creatures and unconscious intentional states in high creatures show that intentionality is primitive, and that consciousness is not necessary for intentionality. Nevertheless, consciousness cannot reduce to intentionality. Because there is a kind of intentionality whose content is determined by phenomenal consciousness. So the relation between consciousness and intentionality is complicate. It is wrong either to explain consciousness on the ground of intentionality or to explain intentionality on the ground of consciousness.