研发联盟的次优技术产权评述——基于不完全合约的产权分析

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摘要文章从垂直与交叉合作两个角度综述了近年来应用GHM理论考察研发联盟次优技术产权的文献。垂直合作研发关注融资问题,照搬GHM框架不会影响其结论,实证检验与理论预测的高度一致性已经证实了这一点。在交叉合作研发领域,将来的研究则需在真实体现其特质和完整展现创新产权类型两方面对已有文献做出补充修正。

作者程金伟费方域

机构地区上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院上海交通大学高级金融学院

出处《现代管理科学》 CSSCI 2011年第3期20-22,共3页 Modern Management Science

关键词研发联盟次优技术产权 GHM

参考文献11

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现代管理科学

2011年第3期

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