双不对称下的技术投资竞争决策

Decision about competition of technology investment under double asymmetric

投资成本、质量(技术)水平以及外部市场偏好将影响不同创新产品或技术的出现顺序.通过考虑创新投资成本、质量(技术)水平、市场偏好等因素构建实物期权投资决策模型,研究了创新成本和产品质量水平都不对称的企业间的竞争决策和合作决策.研究结果表明,无论高成本的高质量企业还是低成本的低质量企业均可能成为领先者,1)企业间产品质量差距越大,两竞争企业的投资时间间隔越小,市场偏好越高,则两企业投资时间间隔越长;2)企业间合作的结果永远是低质量企业先投资,高质量企业后投资,而且竞争和合作投资两种情况下的同质量产品出现的时间差距随着成本差距的增大而增大,随着两企业产品质量差距的增大而缩小,随着市场偏好的增大而增大.

The sequence of introduction of different technologies or product is affected by the difference in technology level （product quality） and investment cost between two technologies or products, and the preference of market. By taking in to consideration of the factors of the preference of market, the difference in technology level, and product quality and cost, this paper constructs a real option model to analyze the equilibrium of competition investment strategy, and cooperation investment of two competitive firms. This study shows that, （ 1 ） firms, either with a high quality and high cost, or a low quality and low cost, may become a leader; further the larger the quality difference, the shorter the interval between the two competition firms; and the higher market preference, the longer the interval between to two competition firms the. （2） Asa result of cooperation investment, the low quality technology＂ always appears first, and then the high quality one. In the two cases of cooperation investment and competition investment, the interval of the introduction of corresponding technologies increases with the of the cost difference, decreases with the quality difference, and increases with of market preference.