基于信号博弈的企业最优技术许可策略选择

Signaling Game and the Firm's Optimal Policy of Technology License

在委托代理理论的框架下,该文构建了一个技术许可方拥有技术质量的私人信息,并提出许可合约的技术许可模型。技术许可双方信息不对称造成的逆向选择可能导致一些有效率的交易无法进行。信号传递是解决逆向选择问题的一种标准方法。在这种情况下,高质量技术的许可方可通过投入资金的规模和项目成功时的收益分配来发送质量信号,与低质量的技术区分开来。但是,在某些情况下,高质量技术的所有者即使有能力发送质量信号但也不会发送。

In a principal-agent framework this paper constructs a model of asymmetric information where the potential licensee is the uninformed party, while the licensor knows the true value of the technology, and it is the licensor who makes the offer. Adverse selection stemming out from informational asymme tries between licensor and licensee may prevent efficient transaction. Signaling is a standard solution provided to the adverse-selection problem. We show that a licensor signals his technology type with his investment and revenue sharing. However, for some parameter values a high-type licensor could truthfully signal his quality, but it is not necessarily in his interest to do so.