我国上市公司债权人治理效率——基于内部视角的联立方程研究

Maturity Structure of Debt,Investment Behavior and Controlling Shareholder Expropriation——A Simultaneous Equations Model Based On Company Governance Angle

为了确定债权人治理失效的环节,本文将债权人治理机制分解为债权人筛选机制和债权人监督机制,在控制了上市公司债务期限结构、过度投资和利益输送行为之间内生性联系的基础上,采用2001—2006年的全部A股上市公司作为样本,对银行系统风险提高和上市公司代理问题激化的原因进行了深入的分析。实证结果表明我国债权人治理效率普遍不高:从股权性质来看,银行对于国有上市公司的治理效率低于民营上市公司,国有公司中普遍存在着长期债务引发的过度投资和利益输送问题;从股权结构来看,银行对于所有权和控制权分离的公司治理效率更低,这类公司更容易出现长期债务引发的过度投资问题。

To identify the weak chains of credit governance mechanism, this paper divides credit governance mechanism into credit screening mechanism and credit supervision mechanism to analyze the relationship among the maturity structure of debt, investment behavior and controlling shareholder expropriation using a data set of A-share listed firms over the period 2001 - 2006. This paper also provides further discussion on the reason behind the systematic risk in banking markets and the agency problems of listed companies. The main results from the empirical analysis are as follows ： the credit governance mechanism is inefficient in China, and induces overinvestment in listed companies. From the aspect of equity nature, the credit screening mechanism is inefficient in state-owned listed companies, as the companies with problems of overinvestment or expropriation are more likely to access to long term debt. The credit supervision mechanism is also inefficient in state-owned listed companies, as they make use of long term debt to overinvest or expropriate minority shareholders. From the aspect of equity structure, the companies with greater divergence between control rights and cash flow rights make use of long term debt to overinvest, which implies that the credit governance mechanism is inefficient in these companies.