多维经济效率视角下的企业合并反垄断规制——兼评“可口可乐与汇源合并案”

The Anti-monopoly by Regulating Enterprises Merger in the View of Multidimensional Economic Efficiencies: A Case Study of the Merger between Coca-Cola and HuiYuan

由于新古典经济学静态模型依托的有限相关市场假设、绝对进入壁垒假设、单一定价策略假设均不能成立,企业合并形成的行业巨头在大多数情况下不会对静态配置效率、动态效率和X-效率的多维经济效率造成损害。因此,在一般市场中,应放松对企业合并的反垄断规制,而在两类特殊市场中,则应加强标准化管理。

The over-abstracting basal hypothesizes of the static model of New Classical Economics which include limited correlation market,absolute entering difficulty,and single price strategy can't appear in the real life.By analyzing the case of the merger between Coca-cola and Huiyuan,we find that big business resulting from merger won't do harm to the allocative efficiency,dynamic efficiency and X-efficiency.Thus,it is necessary to deregulate enterprises merger in common market and reinforce standardizing regulation in two kinds of special market.