公司丑闻、声誉机制与董事会重构

Corporate Scandals,Reputation Mechanism and Board Rebuild

本文以2003～2008年受到证监会处罚的上市公司作为研究样本,实证研究了声誉机制对公司董事会构成的影响。我们发现这些公司董事会的构成在丑闻发生前后有明显变化,尤其是董事会中独立董事所占的比例显著增加。回归结果显示,独立董事的比例与声誉惩罚之间存在显著相关性,表明发生丑闻的公司为了重建企业声誉和挽回投资者的信心,会通过增加董事会中独立董事所占的比例以加强董事会的监督职能。本文的研究结论为声誉机制的公司治理效果研究提供了经验证据,同时也拓展了董事会构成变化的研究,依此本文提出了相应的政策建议。

In this paper, the author selects listed companies as research sample which were punished by the China Securities Regulatory Commission （CSRC） from 2003 to 2008, and studied whether the reputation mechanism could alter board composition. The author finds that board composition obviously changed after scandal, especially independent directors significantly increased in board. Furthermore, regression results show that firms increase independent director in board to strength supervision function in order to rebuild reputation and restore investor＇s confidence. The results of this study not only provide empirical evidence that reputation mechanism can improve corporate governance, but also develop the research on the composition of the board. According to the conclusion, we put forward policy recommendations.