官员晋升竞争与边界效应：以省区交界地带的经济发展为例

Bureaucratic Promotion Competition and Border Effect:Evidence from Economic Development in China's Border Regions

本文运用中国1997～2003年县级面板数据,系统考察了省区交界地带与非交界地区经济发展的差异。我们发现,位于省界线上的县级区域的人均GDP显著低于非省界上的县级地区;而国境线上的县域经济发展则不受边界因素的影响。交界省份越多,位于交界线附近的县份经济发展越落后。交界线上的两省经济差距越接近,交界地区的县域经济的发展相对来说越落后。所有这些经验发现与中国地方官员的政治锦标赛理论相一致,而其他相关理论无法给予一致的解释。

Using the county-level data from 1997 to 2003 in China, this paper examines the economic development in the border regions of China＇s provinces. It is found that the border regions within China have a lower per capita GDP than that in non-border regions, while international borders do not produce such negative effects on economic development. Moreover, the border involves more provinces, the border regions are less developed, and that the smaller the economic gap between two provinces where border regions belong, the worse for these border regions. All these evidences are consistent with the predictions of the political tournament theory, and other theories cannot offer satisfactory and consistent interpretations.