摘要
本文就管理者—员工纵向信任行为的问题,在一般化假设的基础上,建立了同时考虑了员工的物质效用和互惠心理效用的序贯互惠"囚徒困境"博弈模型,进行了定量的分析,分析结果表明:当管理者首先实施不信任行为时,若员工具有完全理性或互惠动机不够大时,员工倾向于选择实施不信任行为;而当管理者首先实施信任行为时,如果员工互惠动机足够大,则员工会选择实施信任行为,如果员工的互惠动机处于两者之间时,则会以一定概率实施信任行为。
The paper constructs a prisoner＇s dilemma game model of sequential reciprocity considering both material utility and reciprocity psychological utility of employees based on the general hypothesis and makes a quantificational analysis.The results show that employees who are rational or don＇t have enough reciprocity motivation won＇t conduct trust behavior after the mistrust behavior conducted by manager.The employees who have enough reciprocity motivation will conduct trust behavior after trust behavior conducted by manager and they will conduct trust behavior with certain probability when their reciprocity motivation lies between two cases above.
出处
《预测》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第2期46-50,共5页
Forecasting
基金
国家社会科学基金资助项目(07BJY017)
重庆工商大学青年基金资助项目
关键词
管理者—员工纵向信任
互惠
序贯博弈
囚徒困境
manager-employee longitudinal trust
reciprocity
sequential game
prisoner＇s dilemma
