公司治理广义视角下的股东间代理问题分析——以“实德投资减持大元股份”为例

An Analysis of the Problems of Agency among Shareholders in the Broad Sense of the Corporate Governance——Taking Shide Investment Corporation Reducing the Shareholding of Ningxia Dayuan Chemical Co.Ltd. as an Example

"实德投资减持大元股份"事件表明将关注焦点集中于资本所有者与管理者之间的代理问题的公司治理理论难以对我国公司治理现实中的一些现象进行有效解释,因而需要从企业各缔约方对控制权要求的更广阔的视角研究公司治理。其中,在管理控制方面,大股东与小股东之间形成了委托—代理关系,并存在着严重的代理问题。在信息不对称的条件下,大股东的寻租行为会对小股东收益、资本市场发展、收入分配等方面产生负面影响。因此,股东内部各利益团体之间的关系应当成为公司治理的一项十分重要的内容。

The event of Shide Investment Corporation reducing the shareholding of the Ningxia Dayuan Chemical Co. Ltd. indicates that the theory of corporate governance, which focuses on the agency problem between shareholders and managers, can not explain the factual issues in China＇ s corporate governance very well. So it is necessary to research corporate governance in the broad sense of all parties in the corporate contracts of enterprises e, laiming the right of control. In the issue of the management control, there is principal - agency relationship between large shareholders and small shareholders and serious agency problems. Under the asymmetric information, the rent - seeking action of large shareholders will do harm to the income of small shareholders, the development of the capital market, and the income distribution. Therefore the relationship among the interest groups within shareholders should become a very important content of the corporate governance.