摘要
运用进化博弈理论研究存在腐败行为的扶贫资金监察问题,建立了对应的博弈模型,分析了下级官员和上级部门之间的行为选择,获得了各个博弈方的复制动态方程,探讨了博弈模型在不同情形下的进化稳定策略。研究结果表明,下级官员和上级部门在有限理性基础上得到的进化稳定策略与博弈双方的收益、系统所处的初始状态有关。并根据所提出的博弈模型,提出了合理性建议。
The anti-poverty capital with corrupt behaviors supervision game model was studied by using the evolutionary game theory,and the corresponding game model was established,moreover,the behaviors choice between the junior official and the senior department were analyzed.Finally,the duplicative dynamic equation of each player in this game was obtained and the evolutionary stable strategy of this game model in different circumstances was investigated.The results showed that the evolutionary stable strategy of the junior official and the senior department based on bounded rationality depended on the payoff of each player and the initial state of the system.Finally,some reasonable advices based on the evolutionary game model were proposed.
出处
《安徽农业科学》
CAS
北大核心
2011年第4期2472-2475,共4页
Journal of Anhui Agricultural Sciences
基金
默科合体R字[2010]LKC2032号
关键词
扶贫资金
腐败行为
监察
进化博弈
复制动态方程
进化稳定策略
Anti-poverty fund
Malversation
Supervision
Evolutionary game
Duplicative dynamic equation
Evolutionary stable strategy