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银行竞争主体的塑造及银行保险的进一步演变趋势——银监会监管政策效应的经济学分析 被引量:4

Bank as a competition entity and further evolution of bancassurance business——An economics analysis on the impacts of the regulatory policy of CBRC
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摘要 银行保险本是银行与保险两个主体之间的市场化行为,由于烙上金融改革背景,必然交织政府监管与企业自主行为过程。本文从经济学的角度对银监会《关于进一步加强商业银行代理保险业务合规销售与风险管理的通知》的监管政策效应给出理论分析:银监会与保监会两个监管主体监管节奏的不一致造成了银行与保险的市场化程度不同;市场化滞后的银行在渠道合作中如再不增强主体意识,将导致消费者对两个金融主体难以信任的社会危机。银监会监管的政策效应更多体现为培养及强化银行的主体意识,辅导银行具有市场竞争能力;政府监管的社会责任目标通过培植合格的市场合作主体来实现。由此,银行市场主体的培育完全放任其在市场竞争中自然成长已不符合今天银行保险的格局,银监会干预银行的市场行为监管不失为是通过市场监管来间接实现社会公众利益维护的社会监管的有效措施之一。 Bancassurance is originally a market-driven form of cooperation between banks and insurance companies. However, under the background of financial reform, it unavoidably becomes an interweaving of government regulation and enterprise self-independent behaviors. The paper made a theoretical analysis from economics point of view on the impacts of the CBRC's policy "The notice on further strengthening sales compliance and risk management of commercial banks acting as insurance agencies" :the mismatching of regulatory tempo between CBRC and CIRC resulted in the difference of marketization of these two regulators;if banks,lagging behind in marketization, fails to strengthen their identity as a competition principal,it may trigger off a social crisis due to the lack of trust in the two regulatory bodies. The CBRC's policy should be more intended to enhance bank's awareness as a competi- tion principa],therefore strengthen their market competitive competence. And the social objective of government reg- ulation should be realized through cultivating qualified market entities. As a result,in view of the development of bancaurance today,it is not advisable to left banks to cultivate their awareness as a competition principal on their own. The CBRC's intervention in bancassurance activities should be one of the effective measures to indirectly safeguard public interests through social regulation.
作者 薛梅
出处 《保险研究》 北大核心 2011年第3期45-51,共7页 Insurance Studies
关键词 银行保险 市场合作 监管 bancassurance market cooperation regulation
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共引文献272

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