国家控制、债务融资与大股东利益侵占——基于沪深两市上市公司的经验证据

Government Control,Debt Financing and Occupation by Large Shareholders——Based on Empirical Research on Listed Companies in China

以2004～2006年的非金融类上市公司为样本,考察了债务融资及其结构对大股东利益侵占行为的影响,从而揭示出我国上市公司中股东—债权人冲突和负债作为治理机制所带来的经济后果。研究结果显示,虽然债务融资总体上对大股东侵占行为没有治理效果,但债务融资中的银行债务及短期借款能够对大股东的利益侵占行为起到一定的抑制作用。按最终控制人性质进行分组检验的结果表明,商业信用、银行债务与短期借款在非国有控股公司中能够对大股东的利益侵占行为起到更好的治理作用,而长期债务在非国有控股公司和国有控股公司中不但没有起到治理作用,反而加剧了大股东的利益侵占。

To disclose the economic effects of the stockholder-bondholder conflicts and debt as an element of corporate governance,this paper examines the impact of debt financing and the type of debt on the controlling shareholders＇ fund appropriation with the data of Chinese listed companies from 2004 to 2006.Empirical results illuminate that debt financing and short debt can control over the controlling shareholders＇ fund appropriation behavior generally,although total debt financing can not do so.But for the further study divided the sample into two groups based on the last controller,the result shows that bank debt,short debt and credit financing ratio have controlled the fund appropriation better in non-state controlled firms,while long debt have had no great control on the behavior of fund appropriation but worsened the behavior both in state-controlled firms and state controlled firm.