政治联系、审计师选择的“地缘”偏好与审计意见——基于国有上市公司的经验证据

Political Connections,Regional Preference of Audit Choice and Audit Opinions——Evidence from Chinese state-owned listed companies

政治联系是中国资本市场上市公司的普遍现象,对审计行为产生着重要的影响。本文手工搜集了国有上市公司2004—2008年关键高管的政治联系数据,实证研究了政治联系对审计师选择的"地缘偏好"和审计意见的影响。研究结果表明:政治联系的国有上市公司显著地倾向于选择"本地小所"、具有"地缘偏好"性,且该结论主要适用于地方国有上市公司。对于既定的盈余质量,政治联系的国有上市公司获得"非标"审计意见的概率显著地更低。

As an universal phenomenon in listed companies of Chinese capital markets, political connections have vital influence on auditing behavior. The paper manually collects political connections data of key top managers including presidents and directors in state-owned listed companies from 2004 to 2008, and empirically studies the relation between political connections and regional preference phenomenon of auditor choice and audit opinions. The results show that politically connected state-owned listed companies significantly prefer to choose regional small CPA firms, and politically connected state-owned listed companies controlled by local governments have more regional preference. For defined earnings quality, politically connected state-owned listed companies have lower probability of receiving unqualified audit opinions than others.