信息披露质量、控股股东资金占用与审计师选择——来自深市A股上市公司的经验证据

Information Disclosure Quality,Controlling Shareholder's Embezzlement and Auditors Selection——Empirical evidence from shenzhen share A listed companies

资金侵占是控股股东利用控制权获取私人利益的重要表现形式,也是其解决资金缺乏的重要途径,普遍存在于信息不对称严重的公司。而有效的信息披露制度则会提高公司透明度,减轻信息不对称程度,保护中小投资者免受控股股东的掠夺。作为外部治理机制的审计是公司信息披露质量的重要保证,也能够缓解代理问题,对中小投资者起到保护作用。因此,本文选取深圳A股上市公司作为样本,研究信息披露质量、控股股东资金占用以及审计师选择之间的关系。实证结果发现,信息披露质量越高的公司会减少控股股东的资金占用并且倾向于选择高质量的审计师,高质量审计师也能够起到降低控股股东的资金占用的效果。这一研究结果对加强信息披露监管以及审计的治理效应有着重要的启示。

Embezzlement is an important form for controlling shareholder using control rights to obtain private benefit, and also an important way to solve shortage of funds, widely existing in serious information asymmetrical companies. However, an effective information disclosure system can increase corporate transparency, reduce information asymmetry, and protect small investors from tunnelling of＇the controlling shareholder. Audit, as an external governance mechanism is an important guarantee for information disclosure quality, can reduce agency problem, and plays protective role of small shareholder. Therefore, This paper choose Shenzhen share a listed companies as a sample, investigates the relationship between information disclosure quality, controlling shareholder＇s embezzlement and auditors selection. The results show that the companies with higher information disclosure have less Embezzlement, and have more prone to choose high-quality auditors. High-quality auditors can also play the role to reduce the controlling shareholder＇s embezzlement. The results have important implications to strengthen information disclosure regulation and audit governance effects.