BOT公路排他性条件对定价及社会效益影响研究被引量：15

Research on effect of exclusive condition on pricing and social welfare of road under BOT scheme

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摘要分析了私营财团和政府在BOT(build-operate-transfer)高等级公路的建设运营中的完全信息动态博弈过程,研究了公路建设中的排他性条件和出行者的不同时间价值这两个因素对道路定价和社会效益的影响问题.研究表明:私营财团在追求自身收益最大化目标下的收费价格决策,同时能够带来正的社会效益.而且,理论分析的结果证实排他性条件会随着高收入类出行者数量的不同而对私营财团收费价格以及社会效益产生不同影响,因此在政府授予特许权时应慎重考虑排他性条件的承诺. This paper analyzes the complete information dynamic game between the private consortium and government in BOT（build-operate-transfer） highway construction and operation,and studies the impacts of exclusive conditions and different time values of travelers on road pricing and social welfare in construction of highway.Research results indicate that the toll road can bring benefits to society when the private company is in pursuit of maximizing his own profit.And the results of theoretical analysis show that the influence of the exclusive conditions on the price of the toll road and social welfare varies with the number of high income travelers,so the government should award the concessions with discretion.

作者孙慧范志清石烨

机构地区天津大学管理与经济学部国家开发银行天津市分行

出处《系统工程学报》 CSCD 北大核心 2011年第1期68-73,共6页 Journal of Systems Engineering

基金国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772057)

关键词 BOT 收费公路定价排他性条件社会效益 BOT toll road pricing exclusive condition social welfare

分类号 F570.3 [经济管理—产业经济]

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参考文献13

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