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政企关系网络、在职消费与市场化制度建设 被引量:27

Government-Enterprise Relationship Network,Duty Consumption and Institutional Construction of Marketization
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摘要 在职消费是企业高管人员侵蚀公司剩余资源的一种方式,也是当前企业普遍面临的一个现实难题。本文选取沪深A股2005-2007年的数据为样本,对国有企业与非国有企业的在职消费问题及其对企业经营行为的影响进行了验证。研究发现,国有企业的政企关系网络给企业带来了更大的在职消费规模,非国有经济中的政企关系网络则显著抑制了在职消费水平;市场化建设的推进能够有效地降低政府对国有企业的控制,抑制非国有企业对政企关系网络的诉求,降低在职消费水平,提高企业业绩。这一研究表明,在我国法制尚不完善、产权保护不力等制度背景下,抑制在职消费、减轻企业负担不仅仅要解决传统的代理关系问题,更重要的是还应考虑制度缺失给企业带来的高昂交易成本。从长远来看,加速推进市场化制度建设则是有效抑制企业寻租动机,削弱在职消费行为、降低交易成本的重要制度保障,也是提高企业业绩进而提高社会资源配置效率的重要举措。 Duty consumption can be one way for the senior executives' embezzling of the corporate residual assets,which poses a difficult issue for the enterprise nowadays.This article,taking the sample data from a-share markets in both Shanghai and Shenzhen and from the point of view of political networks among those senior executives,has made an analysis on the effect of the duty consumption in state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises towards the management of the enterprises.The research has found out that the political networks in the state-owned enterprises have enlarged the scale of duty consumption,however,on the other hand,the duty consumption has been notably suppressed by such network in non-state-owned enterprise.The marketization process can effectively lower down the control of the government over state-owned enterprises and reduce the appeal of the non-state-owned enterprises for the government enterprises relationship networks,so as to bring down the scale of duty consumption and to boost the enterprises' profit.The article has also pointed out that on the premise of a imperfect legal system and weak protection of ownership in our country,it is of great significance to press down the scale of duty consumption and improve enterprises' performance in solving the traditional agency issue,more importantly,to reduce the expensive transaction fees due to the lack of proper system and regulations.From a long term view,accelerating the process of marketization can effectively reduce the rent-seeking activities,bring down duty consumption and transaction costs,and further optimize the allocation of resources in the entire society.
出处 《统计研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第2期53-58,共6页 Statistical Research
关键词 政治关系网络 在职消费 企业业绩 制度环境 Political Networks Duty Consumption Enterprises Performance Institutional Environment
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参考文献15

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