管理层自利、董事会治理与费用粘性——来自中国制造业上市公司的经验证据

Managerial Self-interest,Board Governance and Cost Stickiness

业务量等额增减变化时成本费用减少的幅度小于成本费用增加的幅度。这与传统的成本性态模型中假设成本费用随业务量的增减同幅度地增减变动有着明显的差异。对中国沪深两市740家A股制造业上市公司2007—2009年的年度财务数据测试发现:制造业上市公司销管费用确实存在粘性行为:营业收入增加1%,销管费用增加0.5876%,而营业收入减少1%,销管费用减少0.4112%;制造业上市公司管理层自利行为和销管费用粘性程度之间存在正相关关系;两职(董事会主席和CEO)分离可以有效控制销管费用粘性水平;独立董事比例和销管费用粘性程度之间具有负相关关系;董事会规模和销管费用粘性水平之间呈现正相关关系,但未通过显著性检验。

The reductive range of cost is less than the increased range when the portfolio matching increasing and decreasing,which behaviour contradicts the traditional model which assumes that costs behave symmetrically for activity increases and decreases.With the analysis of accounting data of 740 Chinese manufacturing listed companies during 2007 to 2009,we find that SGA costs are sticky in response to changes in revenues.SGA costs increase,on average,by around 0.5876% per 1% increase in revenues,but decrease by only 0.4112% per 1% decrease in revenues.There is a positive association between managerial self-interest behavior and the degree of SGA costs stickiness.The coefficient of CEO and chairman separation is significantly positive,which can reduce the degree of SGA costs stickiness.There is a negative association between independent directors and the degree of SGA.There is a positive association between board size and the degree of SGA costs stickiness,which is also not significant.