摘要
文章以2004年至2009年期间的非金融上市公司为样本,对我国市场化进程、终极股东控制与公司资本投资价值的关系进行实证研究。研究结果发现,终极控制股东的两权分离程度与公司的政府控制性质降低了公司资本投资的价值,两权分离的这种负面作用在低成长与高自由现金流的公司中更严重;市场化进程有利于提升公司资本投资的价值,并能抑制终极控制股东两权分离程度对公司资本投资价值的负面影响,但市场化进程的这种积极作用在政府控制的公司较弱。
On the basis of non-financial listed companies＇ empirical data from 2004 to 2009,this paper investigates the relationship among market development,ultimate shareholders control and the value of corporate capital investment.The results show that both the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of ultimate shareholders and the quality of governmental control over corporations have negative influence on the value of corporate capital investment,and the negative effect of divergence between control rights and cash flow rights is more serious in low growth and high free-cash flow corporations.Market development is propitious to improve the value of corporate capital investment and restrains the negative influence of ultimate shareholders on the value of corporate capital investment.However,the positive effect of market development is weak in government-controlled corporations.
出处
《商业经济与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第3期34-43,共10页
Journal of Business Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70962005)
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(09YJA630103)
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-08-0919)
石河子大学"211工程"重点学科建设项目
关键词
市场化进程
终极股东控制
资本投资价值
两权分离
market development
ultimate shareholders control
value of capital investment
divergence between control rights and cash flow rights
