终极股东控制与债务期限决策——来自中国上市家族企业的证据

Ultimate Shareholder Control and Debt Maturity Decision——Evidence from Chinese Listed Family Companies

现有研究证实企业普遍存在终极股东,本文利用我国303家上市家族企业2007-2009年面板数据检验了终极股东控制和债务期限结构的关系。研究发现：存在终极控制的上市家族企业,随着终极控制权和现金流权分离程度的增加,更愿意采用负债融资,以获取更多可控制资源,实现其控制权私利,并且我国上市家族企业不倾向于短期债务,而更愿意采用长期债务,来实现其非金钱收益,这是因为短期债务能够减少自由现金流量,并具有外部监督效用,限制了终极控制人获取私利的机会。

Current research confirms the existence of ultimate shareholders,and this paper examines the relationship between ultimate shareholder control and debt maturity decision by using the panel data of 303 listed family companies from 2007 to 2009 in China.The result shows：as the separation of the controlling right and cash flow right increases,the firms prefer to adopt debt financing so as to expand the size of controlling resources;what＇s more,these companies tend to increase the long-term debt,that is because the short-term debt,owing to the external supervision effectiveness,limits the ultimate shareholders to get access to gain private benefits.