两种供应商主导程度下的私人电子市场双重Stackelberg博弈

Two Stackelberg Models in Private Electronic Markets with Supplier's Two Dominant Extents

私人电子市场(PEM)具有高度灵敏的信息共享、高协调能力、保密性强等优点。文章探讨了"一对二"供应链的双重Stackelberg博弈,在构建PEM后供应商主导地位不变或减弱时,比较了四种情况下供应链各方收益及供应链效率的变化规律。通过数值分析得出结论:若供应商降为部分主导时,PEM拥有者收益显著上升,但供应链效率最低;若供应商仍然保持完全主导地位,采取线性折扣合约可以使供应链效率达到最大,供应商收益达到最大,PEM拥有者的收益增大但没有在供应商降为部分主导时的收益大,而未构建PEM的制造商收益最低。

With electronic commerce growing rapidly,B2B markets have fractionized three forms included independent public marketplaces,consortia public marketplaces,and private B2B marketplaces.Private electronic markets（PEM） have lots of virtues such as sensitive information sharing,high coordination capacity and high security,etc.Presently the research about PEM is nothing much in academic circle at home and abroad.So this paper focuses on two stackelberg models in private electronic markets with supplier＇s two dominant extents,and finds out supply chain partner＇s optimal revenues and supply chain efficiency,etc,what the model describes is as below,one supplier and two core manufacturers which are called MLMP in a two-echelon supply chain,the first stackelberg game happens in MLMP where ML is a leader.In the second stackelberg game,To the supplier,both of MLMP are its followers in two-echelon supply chain,the supplier keeps the dominant status,at the same time ML hopes build PEM very much.So the paper turns to analyze supply chain partner＇s optimal revenues and supply chain efficiency in four different situations.Firstly,before building PEM,the supplier has totally dominant status.It analyses the stackelberg game between MLMP,and the second stackelberg game in two-echelon supply chain,and supply chain efficiency.At last,this section works over supply chain partner＇s optimal revenues and supply chain efficiency,etc.Secondly,after building PEM,the supplier has totally dominant status.Building PEM enhances the PEM owner＇s production efficiency,and the supplier＇s production efficiency steps up too.In this section the difference is that k1 descends tok2 based on that both ML and the supplier don not take any actions.This section model＇s optimal law is as same as the first situation.Thirdly,after building PEM,the supplier has partly dominant status.Because of the status improving,ML can decide procurement price.So the game law changes further.After investigating the stackelberg game between MLMP,and the second stackelberg game in two-echelon supply chain,and supply chain efficiency,this section concludes theorem 1 and theorem 2.Theorem 1 tells us,after building PEM,when supplier＇s status is from totally dominant to partly dominant,PEM owner＇s status goes up,and its procurement price is cheaper than the second situation.Theorem 2 reveals that,in the third situation,PEM owner＇s optimal order quantity optimal revenues become bigger together,However,the MP＇s status becomes weaker,and the supplier＇s optimal revenue decreases,even the total supply chain efficiency cuts down too.Fourthly,after building PEM,when the supplier has totally dominant status,it introduces linear quantity discount contract to join the stackelberg game.That is,the supplier still has totally dominant status,it enjoys cheaper marginal costs and offers linear quantity discount contract to ML and MP,which could decreases ML＇s procurement price.This section concludes theorem 3,and conditions that supply chain optimal variables exist in.besides,it finds out the coordination of supply chain does not exist.Finally,by numerical analysis,it verifies theorems above and concludes that,if supplier＇s dominant position is weaker,the PEM owner＇s optimal revenue will go up significantly,however supply chain efficiency will be lowest;If supplier keeps the same dominant position as before setting PEM,with a linear quantity discount contract both the supplier and supply chain efficiency become biggest.However,although PEM owner＇s optimal revenue goes up,it is much lower than in the situation that supplier＇s position is weaker,and the manufacturer＇s optimal revenue becomes zero.