政府干预、政治联系与民营上市公司投资

Political Connction,Government Intervention and Investment:Evidence from China Individual-Controlled Listed Firms

本文以2004～2006年中国沪深两市的民营上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了政府干预、政治联系对民营上市公司的投资活动的影响。研究发现,当地地方政府、中央企业和异地地方政府对民营上市公司的投资过度活动没有显著影响。当地地方政府干预对民营上市公司投资不足没有显著影响,而中央企业和异地地方政府对民营上市公司投资不足有显著影响。这说明,中央企业和异地地方政府可以作为制度的替代机制保护民营上市公司不受当地政府干预的影响。

This paper examines the link between political connction,government intervention,and China＇s individual-controled listed firm＇s investment.Using the samples of individual-controlled firms during 2004-2006,it finds that the local government,centre enterprises and local government of other district have few effect on individual-controled firm＇s over-investment.Local government have few effect on under-investment of the individual-controled firms,but centre enterprise and local government of other district have distinct effects.The finding implies that centre enterprise and local government of other district,as a alternative mechanism,can protect the individual-controled firm from the local government＇s intervention.